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CONVICTIONS THROUGH HEARSAY IN
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES: A




In 1603, Sir Walter Raleigh was tried for high treason. The indictment
alleged that Raleigh and Lord Cobham conspired to overthrow the King
and replace him with Arabella Stuart, using the assistance of the Austrian
Archduke and the King of Spain. Arabella Stuart, in ascending to the
Crown, would establish peace between England and Spain, tolerate Popish
and Roman superstition, and agree to be bound by the Archduke, the King
and the Duke of Savoy in contracting a marriage.1
The principle evidence against Raleigh was a confession given by Lord
Cobham while under interrogation in the tower shortly after the period of
the alleged conspiracy.2 Raleigh urged that the evidence was inadmissible
because it was unreliable hearsay. In response to Raleigh's argument that
Cobham implicated Raleigh out of a desire to help himself, the attorney for
the prosecution responded that while "[t]he accusation of a man on hear-
say, is nothing; would he accuse himself on passion, and ruinate his case
and posterity, out of malice to accuse you?" 3 The prosecutor also alluded
to an earlier statement of Cobham to his brother in which Cobham said
"'[y]ou' are fools, you are on the bye, Raleigh and I'[sic] are on the main;
we mean to take away the 'king and his cubs'."4 Thus, the prosecution
* Professor of Law at the University of Wisconsin.
1. For a detailed account of Sir Walter Raleigh's treason trial, see 2 COBBETr'S A COMPLETE
COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 1-59 (1809) [hereinafter 2 COBBETr'S].
2. Id. at 10, 11, 17, 19. There is no question that today this confession would be inadmissible
as hearsay, even in a joint trial with Cobham. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
3. 2 COBBETT's, supra note 1, at 14. Presumably, the argument that Cobham would "ruinate
his... posterity" referred to the legal consequence that Cobham's heirs would not inherit his
estate if he were found guilty of treason, a potent argument. At another point, the attorney for the
Crown stated: "when a man, by his accusation of another, shall, by the same accusation, also
condemn himself, and make himself liable to the same fault and punishment: this is more forcible
than many Witnesses." Id. at 7.
4. Id. at 14. Expressed in terms of today's rules of evidence, the prosecutor's argument is that
Cobham's statement to his brother was a declaration against his penal interest. Since not offered
to exonerate the accused, it is admissible without the need for corroboration if the declarant is
unavailable. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). The evidence on this point suggested Cobham's availabil-
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urged that the hearsay confession was usable both because it was reliable
and because it was corroborated, albeit by other hearsay.
Raleigh's defense, in addition to a denial of the charge, rested on the
claim that two witnesses were required to prove treason,' and principally,
that "bear with me if I desire one."6 He noted that for the simplest of civil
cases the witness had to be deposed, "[g]ood my lords, let my Accuser
come face to face, and be deposed."7 Raleigh noted that "where the Ac-
cuser is not to be had conveniently, I agree with you; but here my Accuser
may; he is alive, and in the house." 8 What made Raleigh's case even
stronger is that he had a letter from Cobham in which Cobham retracted
his implication of Raleigh and stated explicitly, "[s]o '[sic] God have mercy
upon my soul, as I know no 'Treason by you.' "I One of the Commissioners
seemed to agree with Raleigh that Cobham should be forced to face Ra-
leigh, but the Lord Chief Justice observed that "[t]his thing cannot be
granted, for then a number of Treasons should flourish.""0
Raleigh's argument on his own behalf was simple. Without Cobham's
confession there was no evidence against him." Cobham was as "revengeful
as any man on earth" and Cobham's confession alone was simply insuffi-
cient evidence to convict.12 Interestingly, in arguing the insufficiency of the
evidence and in observing that Cobham could easily be brought to court but
would not because he "dares not accuse me," 3 Raleigh cited precedent,
ity. 2 COBBETT'S, supra note 1, at 19. In addition, there is a serious question whether, even if
Cobham were unavailable, the statement could be used to show Raleigh's involvement in the
conspiracy, as opposed to Cobham's. United States v. Palumbo, 639 F.2d 123, 127, 129-34 (3d
Cir. 1981). The concurrence in Palumbo indicates that even at this late date there is something
less than complete certainty on the issue. See also Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 551-53 (1986)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
5. 2 COBBETT'S, supra note 1, at 15. Raleigh cited both English law and scripture in support
of his argument.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 19. The "face-to-face" component of the confrontation clause, as opposed to the
right to cross-examine was recently invoked by the U.S. Supreme Court in Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct.
2798, 2802 (1988). In Coy, a divided Court held that-the placing of a one-way screen between two
thirteen-year old accusing witnesses and the defendant, which prevented the witnesses from seeing
the defendant, violated his right to face his accusers. Id. at 2802-03. The Court specifically noted
the distinction between the right to question and the right to physically confront the witnesses
giving evidence against an accused at trial. Id. at 2803.
8. 2 COBBETT'S, supra note 1, at 19.
9. Id. at 28-29.
10. Id. at 18.
11. Id. at 23.
12. Id. at 23, 26.
13. Id. at 23.
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noting that "[i]f you grant me not this favour [sic], I am strangely used;
Campion was not denied to have his accusers face to face."14
I have gone into this level of detail on this old case because, despite its
age, its arguments have a modem ring to them. Raleigh had two com-
plaints about the Crown's failure to call Cobham. He could not cross-ex-
amine Cobham and Cobham was not compelled to look at Raleigh and
accuse him. The Crown argued that there was an inherent reliability in
Cobham's confession because Cobham would not implicate himself if it
were not true, and the cryptic hearsay statement to Cobham's brother cor-
roborated the confession. Finally, it was argued that if the rule were other-
wise, treason would go unpunished.
Sir Walter Raleigh was convicted and subjected to the extremely severe
penalties then applicable to treason. 15 The case, however, is generally con-
sidered to be the beginning of the end of such use of hearsay evidence.
While hearsay continued to be admitted during the reigns of the Stuarts in
the 17th century, objections to it increased as confidence in its reliability
was undermined. 6 It was derided as "a tale of a tale" or "a story out of
another man's mouth." 17 By the end of the century, according to Wigmore,
the rule against hearsay crystallized,"8 and of course, the general notion of
its inadmissibility is the rule today.19
There appears little doubt that the principal reason for the exclusion of
hearsay is that hearsay evidence deprives the person against whom the evi-
dence is admitted of the right to cross-examine the witness that matters.20
While it is true that Sir Walter Raleigh could cross-examine the interroga-
tor of Lord Cobham, such cross-examination would be limited to the accu-
racy with which the interrogator noted what Lord Cobham had said, and
could not delve into the underlying facts.21 It is important to note, how-
ever, that cross-examination is not the end in itself. Wigmore has noted
14. Id. In the treason trial of Edmund Campion and others, a witness testified as to Cam-
pion's statements which presumably supported a papal plot to overthrow Queen Elizabeth. 1
HOWELL'S A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS, 1050, 1063 (1816).
15. 2 COBBETr'S, supra note 1, at 31. Although Raleigh was executed, the execution actually
took place many years after his trial.
16. 5 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1364 at 18 (Chadboura rev. ed. 1974).
17. Id. at 18-19 n.32.
18. Id. at 18.
19. FED. R. EVID. 802.
20. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 245 at 728 (West, 3d ed. 1984). It is clearly not the only
reason. See Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2798. (The right to cross-examine was totally intact, but only
where the accuser did not have to physically face the accused).
21. Raleigh specifically argued that he would ask Cobham if Raleigh knew of a letter from
the Austrian ambassador brought to Cobham. 2 CoBBETT'S, supra note 1, at 2, 23. It is not clear
whether this would have been particularly helpful to Raleigh if Cobham were as vengeful as Ra-
1988]
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that cross-examination is "beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever
invented for the discovery of truth.' ' 22 It follows from this that if the real
end is not simply cross-examination per se, but the discovery of truth, then
if hearsay is reliable, it may still be admissible.
Over the years numerous exceptions to the rule against hearsay devel-
oped on precisely this ground. Some developed as late as 1942.23 Each had
its own justification for reliability, and in a narrow focus, the logic for each
is undeniable.24 By the time the rules of evidence were codified in 1975, the
number of such exceptions was almost two dozen. In the Federal Rules of
Evidence (hereinafter listed by specific rule), Rule 803 contains twenty-
three specific exceptions to the rule against hearsay. These exceptions are
applicable regardless of the availability of the person making the state-
ment. 25 There seems little doubt that the basis for these exceptions is the
belief that in each case, there is sufficient reliability about the hearsay to
warrant its admission. As clear a guide as any to the logic of the twenty-
three designated exceptions is the catch-all exception found in Rule
803(24). Under this catch-all provision, an out of court statement not cov-
ered by any of the prior exceptions, "but having equivalent circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness" is admissible, if certain other requirements
are met.26
Another exception, which now becomes the major focus of this article,
is Rule 803(4). Under Rule 803(4), the rule against hearsay does not bar
leigh said he was. In any case, Raleigh seemed to proceed on the theory that if forced to actually
face him, Cobham could not bring himself to implicate Raleigh.
22. 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 16, § 1367 at 32. Wigmore's observation was cited with ap-
proval in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970).
23. An example of the cumbersome and tedious manner in which exceptions to the hearsay
rule become the law is provided by the present sense impression exception. This exception was
originally proposed by Professor Thayer in 1881. See Thayer, Bedingfield's Case-Declarations as
a Part of the Res Gestae, 15 AM. L. REv. 1 (1881). The exception was not formally adopted until
1942 in Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis, 139 Tex. 1, 161 S.W.2d 474 (1942), although several cases
had held such statements admissible under different exceptions to the rule. C. MCCORMICK,
supra note 20, § 298 at 861 n.9. See also FED. R. EvID. 803(1).
Over fifty years ago, the hearsay rule exceptions were referred to as "an old-fashioned crazy
quilt, made of patches cut from a group of paintings by cubists, futurists and surrealists." Morgan
& Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 HARV. L. REv. 909, 921 (1937).
24. For example, the justification for the admission of an excited utterance made contempora-
neously with the event which is the subject of the utterance under FED. R. EvID. 803(2) is that the
excited nature of the utterance and its spontaneity preclude fabrication or error in reporting.
Therefore, the utterance is reliable and admissible as an exception to the rule against hearsay.
25. There are, in addition, several exceptions where the declarant must be unavailable for the
exception to apply: mainly former testimony, declarations against interest and dying declarations.
See FED. R. EVID. 804.
26. FED. R. EVID. 803(24).
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"[s]tatements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and
describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain or sensations,
or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof
insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment."27 The logic of
the exception is not subtle. Patients believe that the effectiveness of treat-
ment depends largely upon the accuracy of the information provided the
physician and that a misdiagnosis could prove not only costly but painful.28
II. RULE 803(4) AND OTHER EXCEPTIONS IN
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES
2 9
A. Introduction
Child sexual abuse cases are not easy. On one hand, there is the legiti-
mate concern that sexual and physical abuse of children, especially where
the children are in the care of the abuser, are extraordinarily serious of-
fenses. Not only do they involve great damage to a child but such acts
clearly abuse a most sacred trust. The harmfulness of such abuse on the
child may be manifest in the present as well as years, if not decades, in the
future.3" Without question, such cases must be prosecuted. Persons con-
victed of such offenses should be dealt with appropriately which ordinarily
means severely.31
On the other hand, precisely because of the nature of the crime, a false
accusation and conviction constitute a parallel tragedy. Not only is the de-
fendant convicted, but often, one of the by-products of conviction is the loss
of access to the child, with the inevitable disintegration of the family. The
support system that other defendants would rely on in comparable situa-
tions is also taken away, thus creating a compounded injustice.
27. FED. R. EVID. 803(4).
28. KAPLAN AND WALTZ, Evidence 225-26 (University Casebook Series, 1987); C. MCCOR-
MICK, supra note 20, § 292 at 839-40.
29. Child sexual abuse cases are rarely brought in federal court since federal criminal
jurisdiction would cover such cases only in instances where the alleged abuse occurred in federal
enclaves. See, e.g., United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Nick,
604 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1979). Thus, the state counterparts to FED. R. EVID. 803(4) would be
applicable. It should be assumed, unless noted to the contrary, that the pertinent state law is
identical to the federal provision set forth in the text ending at note 27.
30. See O'BRIEN, CHILD ABUsE: A CRYING SHAME 17-18 (1980). The increasing number
of reported incidents of child abuse, about twelve percent of which are sexual abuse, was noted by
the dissent in Coy, 108 S. Ct. at 2808 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
31. See, eg., State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 188, 735 P.2d 799 (1987) (defendant was convicted




There is a need to insure that the rules which govern criminal trials
produce an accurate result. This is accentuated due to the gravity of the
crime and the gravity of a mistake in determining whether there is a crimi-
nal, and that criminal's identity. A review of recent cases suggests that
courts have not been successful in this critical endeavor. In particular,
courts have not been successful in cases where evidence is admitted under
Rule 803(4).
B. Hearsay in Recent Child Sexual Abuse Cases
In State v. Nelson,32 the Wisconsin Supreme Court, by a four to three
margin, upheld the first degree sexual assault conviction of Brian Nelson.
This conviction was grounded on sexual contacts between Nelson and his
three-year old daughter. Nelson and his wife had been divorced when their
child (T.N.) was about two. The mother was granted custodial rights to
T.N. and the father was granted reasonable visitation rights.
The prosecution's proof at trial showed that about a year after the par-
ents divorced, T.N. became apprehensive about visiting her father and
would beg not to visit him. Nelson's former wife testified that T.N. had
described various incidents which unmistakably involved the father in sex-
ual abuse of the child. T.N.'s mother then arranged for T.N. to visit a
clinical psychologist who subsequently interviewed T.N. At trial, the
clinical psychologist testified to a series of almost sixty evaluations and
treatment sessions with T.N. His testimony, which included what T.N. had
told him, once again unmistakably implicated Nelson. However, in one se-
ries of conversations with the psychologist, T.N. said that it was "Mitch"
who did various things to her and not her father. Mitch was a man who
had moved in with T.N.'s mother shortly after the divorce. The psycholo-
gist then testified that T.N. had substituted Mitch and her father a number
of times. Furthermore, T.N. said that her father had told her to say it was
Mitch if anyone asked. The psychologist also testified that when he asked
T.N. if she would only tell the truth, she said "I don't have to tell the
truth. ,3
3
Principally on the basis of this evidence, the jury found Nelson guilty.3 4
In response to a post-conviction motion for a new trial, a hearing was held
on T.N.'s availability. At that hearing, the psychologist who had testified
32. 138 Wis. 2d 418, 406 N.W.2d 385 (1987).
33. Id. at 425, 406 N.W.2d at 388.
34. A second psychologist witness for the prosecution testified as to one session with T.N.
His testimony included what she told him about sexual activities with her father. Id. at 426, 406
N.W.2d at 388. The defense called two psychologists, neither of whom was particularly helpful to
the defense. Id. at 427, 406 N.W.2d at 388-89.
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as to the many sessions with T.N. further testified that questioning her
about the alleged sexual abuse would traumatize her and that the very pres-
ence of her father would have a very negative effect on her. Videotaping her
testimony was not ruled out as a possibility. It was noted, however, that
there would have to be a large number of videotaping sessions. After the
denial of Nelson's new trial motion, Nelson appealed.
In the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the principal issue was the admissibil-
ity of the psychologist's testimony under the Wisconsin counterpart to Rule
803(4). In upholding the conviction, the court noted that the rationale un-
derlying the exception was the guarantee of trustworthiness coming from
the declarant's motive in obtaining improved health. The court found,
based on the solemnity with which the psychologist dealt with T.N., that
T.N. understood the psychologist to be an authority figure, not a playmate,
and that she was aware that she was being observed toward a goal of
treatment.
35
The court then turned to the subordinate but critical question of
whether the identity of the abuser or merely the fact of abuse was admissi-
ble. It noted that, although as a general rule, the identity of the assailant is
not admissible because the assailant's identity is ordinarily not necessary for
treatment, this is not so with respect to child sexual abuse. Because of the
emotional and psychological injuries incident to child sexual abuse, in addi-
tion to whatever physical injuries there may be, the identity of the abuser
affects the nature of the treatment. Therefore, the court held that the evi-
dence was admissible under the hearsay rule exception. 6 The dissent, how-
ever, challenged the finding that T.N. knew she was talking to the
psychologist for diagnostic purposes, noting that there was no exception for
talking to "authority figures." The dissent also pointed out that the alterna-
tive of video taping was a viable one that could have been used in place of
the hearsay.37
35. Id. at 431-32, 406 N.W.2d at 390-91.
36. Id. at 433-34, 406 N.W.2d at 391-92. See Sluka v. Alaska, 717 P.2d 394, 398-402 (Alaska
1986). Sluka involved physical injuries to a three-year old child. Hearsay admitted against Sluka
included the testimony of a physician who examined a three-year old victim whose face was in-
jured. The physician testified that when he spoke to the girl, she told him Sluka had hit her with a
shoe. The Alaska Supreme Court found that since the identity of the assailant was not necessary
for treatment or diagnosis, it was not within the exception and therefore was inadmissible hearsay.
The judgment of conviction was reversed.
37. Nelson, 138 Wis. 2d at 447-49, 406 N.W.2d at 397-98 (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting).
Nelson subsequently attacked the judgment of conviction in a petition for federal habeas
corpus. The attack was based on a claimed failure of Wisconsin to comply with Ohio v. Roberts,
448 U.S. 56 (1980). In Roberts, the prosecution used the preliminary hearing testimony of an
unavailable witness against Roberts at his trial. The Supreme Court upheld the use of such hear-
say, which fit no hearsay rule exception, provided the declarant was unavailable and the hearsay
1988]
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Nelson symbolizes the dilemma of these cases. If one accepts the hear-
say evidence, it is clear that Nelson was guilty and deserved punishment.
On the other hand, where there is evidence, as there was in this case, that
someone other than the defendant may have abused the child, the inability
of the defendant's lawyer to pursue that line of questioning with the witness
seems to be a major failure. Such failure is not obviated even if it is clear
that T.N. knew she was talking to a physician for the purpose of treatment.
Nelson's lawyer might have explored the number of times T.N. was alone
with Mitch, whether she had any conversations with Mitch about the
"truth" and whether the things the psychologist said happened with the
father had actually happened with Mitch. In addition, T.N.'s uncertainty
about the obligation to tell the truth is fertile ground for any defense law-
yer. This is true even where there is no evidence that anyone else might be
involved. The use of hearsay, however, irrevocably marks such ground as
off-limits to the defense.
bore sufficient "indicia of reliability" to ensure the accuracy of the fact finding process. The Court
noted that such indicia exist where the hearsay falls within a firmly rooted exception to the rule.
Id. at 65-75.
In granting Nelson's petition, the district court found neither prong of Roberts satisfied. Nel-
son v. Ferrey, 688 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D. Wis. 1988). After noting that the unavailability prong of
Roberts appeared to have been eroded by the Supreme Court in United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S.
387 (1986), the district court nevertheless applied that requirement and found it was not met. In
so doing, the court noted that "the parties have not cited, and this court has not found, any post-
Inadi decision in which a court has ruled that, under the Constitution, admitting hearsay state-
ments under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4), or a state equivalent, without making a finding that
the declarant is unavailable, does not offend the Confrontation Clause." Ferry, 688 F. Supp. at
1320. It is clear that the district court was reluctant to take the erosion of the unavailability
requirement at face value.
The district court then dealt with the second prong of the Roberts test - indicia of reliability.
It noted that an inquiry into inherent reliability need be undertaken only if, as in Roberts, the
hearsay did not fit within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. Id. at 1323. The court then noted
that while FED. R. EvID. 803(4) "may be a 'firmly rooted' exception from the standpoint of long-
time acceptance," a four-year old declarant was hardly the typical declarant under the exception.
Id. With that observation as the justification for further inquiry, the court found that the indicia
of reliability required under Roberts were not present. Id. at 1323-24. In so doing, the court
obviously wandered from Roberts to permit inquiry into indicia of reliability even where the ex-
ception was established, but where its application was to a novel situation.
There is some justification for this variation from Roberts under Wisconsin law. In State v.
Bauer, 109 Wis. 2d 204, 325 N.W.2d 857 (1982), the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in a case also
involving preliminary hearing testimony, stated "evidence falling within a firmly rooted exception
is not admissible per se." Id. at 213, 325 N.W.2d at 862. It was this language that triggered the
inquiry into the reliability of FED. R. EvID. 803(4) in Nelson. Id. at 429, 406 N.W.2d at 389-90.
Roberts, however, does not compel such an inquiry. Thus, in theory at least, Wisconsin offers
more protection against the use of hearsay than the United States Constitution requires, since
hearsay falling within an exception is not afforded the presumption of reliability which Roberts
gives it. Habeas relief, therefore, appears to have been granted on non-federal ground. It does not
appear from the decision that this argument was advanced by the State.
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The reasoning applied in Nelson was also used by the Arizona Supreme
Court in State v. Robinson.38 In Robinson, the evidence against Robinson
included the testimony of a psychologist who had treated one of the two
children that Robinson was charged with sexually abusing. In holding such
evidence admissible under Arizona's counterpart to Rule 803(4), the court
recognized the general rule that statements to a physician about either the
assailant's identity or some other person's fault are not within the excep-
tion. The court noted that "[t]his general rule, however, is inapplicable in
many child sexual abuse cases because the abuser's identity is critical to
effective diagnosis and treatment."39 Indeed, the psychologist had testified
to that effect at trial.' In Robinson, however, there was non-hearsay evi-
dence implicating the defendant. One of the two girls he was charged with
sexually molesting testified in a videotape procedure to both his sexual as-
sault of her and also the girl whose statements were the subject of the psy-
chologist's testimony.41 Robinson's counsel was present during this
testimony.
Oldsen v. State,42 a Colorado case, is also similar to Nelson. Oldsen was
charged with sexual assault of a child, aggravated incest and child abuse in
38. 153 Ariz. 191, 735 P.2d 801 (1987).
39. Id. at 200, 735 P.2d at 810.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 195, 735 P.2d at 805. Technically, the use of the videotape is "hearsay" since it is
an out-of-court statement. FED. R. EVrD. 801(c). Since, however, the defendant has an opportu-
nity to cross-examine the pertinent witness, the problems generally associated with hearsay are
not present. See generally Roberts, 448 U.S. at 56; State v. Gilbert, 109 Wis. 2d 501, 326 N.W.2d
744 (1982). See also Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legis-
lative Innovations, 98 HARV. L. REv. 806, 813-16 (1985).
State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 337 S.E.2d 833 (1985), is another case where there were both the
non-hearsay testimony of the victims and evidence admitted under the North Carolina counter-
part to FED. R. EVID. 803(4). The problem in Smith is that the person to whom the statements
were made - ostensibly for diagnosis and treatment - was the grandmother of the two cousins
who testified as to the sexual assault by the boyfriend of the mother of one of them. The court
observed that the commentaries to the North Carolina statute indicated that the statements need
not have been made to a physician but could be made to a hospital attendant, ambulance driver or
even a family member. In dealing with the more troublesome question as to the identity of the
person causing them injury, the court noted a "trend" in that direction and then observed that in
any event, the evidence was corroborative of the in-court testimony of the girls. Id. at -, 337
S.E.2d at 840.
In United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1979), the boy's mother was permitted to
testify that shortly after she picked up her three-year old son in the defendant's bedroom, she
noticed "white stuff" inside his clothing and she asked him whether Nick had done anything to
him. The child responded, in essence, that Nick had committed anal intercourse with him. This
evidence was received at trial under the excited utterance exception, FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
Nick's confession, however, was also received into evidence. The Ninth Circuit upheld the admis-
sion of the evidence both on statutory and constitutional grounds.
42. 732 P.2d 1132 (Colo. 1986).
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connection with a series of alleged sexual contacts with his five-year old
daughter. The evidence against Oldsen consisted entirely of the testimony
of a school psychologist, a physician, an investigator with the district attor-
ney's office and a social worker. These persons spoke with the daughter in
their professional capacities and testified as to the alleged offenses as told to
them by the daughter. At the trial, the child was found to be an incompe-
tent witness because of her inability to understand the obligations of a wit-
ness. It was for this reason that the Colorado counterpart to Rule 803(4)
was also found inapplicable because the same considerations that led to the
finding of incompetence also led to the conclusion that she did not under-
stand that what she was saying was said for diagnostic or treatment
purposes.
The trial court, however, admitted the hearsay under the residual catch-
all provision. In large part, this evidence was admitted on the basis of the
physician's testimony that children of the alleged victim's age do not invent
allegations of the sort in issue. The trial court then concluded that young
children ordinarily do not recognize past events that did not occur or re-
spond to stimuli, such as an anatomically correct doll, without a basis for
doing so. Thus, the court reasoned that the prosecution had shown the
hearsay to be supported by circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness,
and therefore, was admissible under the catch-all clause.43
The Colorado Supreme Court, with one dissent, affirmed the conviction.
It noted that other courts relying principally on the assertion that children
are not likely to fabricate stories of sexual abuse, have found that such testi-
mony fits the catch-all hearsay section which the lower court used to war-
rant the admission of the hearsay.' The dissent based its opinion on the
meager record which questioned the reliability of the child's statement to
the three medical professionals.45 It sought a reversal and a new trial so
that the defense would have an opportunity to refute the prosecution's evi-
dence on the trustworthiness of the hearsay.
43. Unlike the defendant in Nelson, Oldsen testified and denied the alleged sexual contacts
with his daughter. The defendant's wife (and child's mother) also testified that she did not think
her husband had sexually assaulted her daughter. Id. at 1134.
44. Id. at 1137 (citing Lancaster v. People, 615 P.2d 720, 722 (Colo. 1980)); see also Nick, 604
F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1979); D.A.H. v. G.A.H., 371 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
45. No one seemed to suggest that the statement made by the child to the investigator for the
district attorney qualified under any exception. The Colorado Court of Appeals, because it based
its decision on the Colorado counterpart to FED. R. EvID. 803(4), found that statement inadmissi-
ble, but harmless error in light of the other admissible hearsay. People v. Oldsen, 697 P.2d 787,
789 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985).
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In State v. Vosika,4 6 the defendant was charged with sodomizing and
sexually abusing her three-year old daughter. The child's foster mother, a
social worker, and a pediatrician all testified about conversations with the
child in which she implicated her mother in the sexual abuse. Although an
Oregon appellate court reversed the conviction because the trial court relied
on a video tape of the pediatrician's interview with the child and failed to
determine the incompetence of the child as a witness on the basis of per-
sonal observations, it went on to discuss the admissibility of the hearsay
evidence.
The appellate court found that the Oregon counterpart to Rule 803(4)
warranted the admission of what the girl told the three witnesses including
the identity of the abuser. While the factual predicate that the child was too
young to understand the purpose of the conversation was similar to the
rationale used in Oldsen, a different result was reached. The court reasoned
that from the perspective of the listeners - the foster mother, the social
worker, and the pediatrician - the information was essential to correctly
treat the child and was properly relied upon by them. Thus, the court rea-
soned that the information was reliable and, therefore, admissible. The
concurring opinion observed that essentially the court was building the
catch-all clause into Rule 803(4).' 7 It concluded that this type of recon-
struction of the rule was not permissible. Ultimately, it is clear by the ma-
jority's reasoning, that if the trial court were to properly decide that the
child was incompetent, Vosika could be convicted entirely on hearsay.4 8
In sum, there are cases such as Robinson in which hearsay evidence is
accompanied by other evidence and affords the defendant an opportunity to
confront his or her accuser. The trend, however, as evidenced by Nelson,
Oldsen and Vosika, is to permit convictions entirely on hearsay without the
accuser ever testifying in any form against the defendant.
46. 83 Or. App. 298, 731 P.2d 449 (1987).
47. Since the majority reversed the judgment of conviction because of the judge's failure to
personally see the child before deciding on her competence, the disagreement on the application of
FED. R. EvID. 803(4) was technically a concurrence, not a dissent.
48. The court, in apparent recognition of the complete hearsay nature of the proof against
Vosika which its opinion envisaged, noted that to rule otherwise would mean that very young
children would be at the mercy of their abusers. If abused in private, their abuser would never
have to worry about prosecution because the only witness to the crime would be too young to
testify. Vosika, 83 Or. App. at -, 731 P.2d at 456; see also Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721 (Wyo.
1984). This decision, relied on in Vosika, in which the state interest in finding the identity of a
possible child abuser was heavily relied on as a justification for holding admissible conversations
with medical personnel under Wyoming's counterpart to FED. R. EVID. 803(4).
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III. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION
It would be needlessly overdramatic to equate any of the defendants in
these cases to Sir Walter Raleigh. There is, nevertheless, a similarity in
their quandry and a familiarity in the arguments that attend their cases.
In Raleigh, when Raleigh objected to the interrogator's testimony about
what Cobham had said, the use of hearsay was justified on grounds of its
reliability: "would he accuse himself on passion, and ruinate his case and
posterity, out of malice to accuse you?"49 When Nelson urged that the
identity of the abuser was not within Rule 803(4), the court replied, "it is
recognized that disclosure of the identity of the assailant is reasonably nec-
essary to provide treatment for a victim of child abuse."5 When Raleigh
urged that Cobham be brought to testify, the crown responded, "this thing
cannot be granted, for then a number of Treasons should flourish."51 In
Vosika, where the defendant insisted that the child testify, the court noted
that agreement with the defense's position would mean that very young
children would be at the mercy of their abusers, and that if abused in pri-
vate, their abuser would never have to worry about prosecution because the
only witness to the crime would be too young to testify.52
Further, as has been demonstrated in Nelson, there are lines of cross-
examination helpful to a defendant that simply cannot be pursued with a
psychologist or any other intermediary whose role in the diagnostic and
treatment process serves as the vehicle for bringing the alleged victim's
hearsay into the trial. In all probability, familiarity with the trial record in
each of these cases where hearsay alone has led to a guilty verdict, would
suggest similar avenues of possibly fruitful cross-examination precluded by
application of Rule 803(4).
On the other hand, it is hard to escape the logic of the idea that where a
child knows that he or she is talking to a doctor as part of an effort to get
treatment, the identity of the abuser is pertinent to the process and there-
fore within the exception. Similarly, if the excited utterance exception is
used,53 the logic of its applicability may also be hard to contest. In short,
because there is a logical basis to each of the exceptions, and since the facts
may warrant invocation of the exception in any case, there appears to be an
insoluble problem. The correct application of any one of a number of rec-
ognized exceptions to the rule against hearsay may result in convictions
49. 2 COBBETT'S, supra note 1, at 14.
50. State v. Nelson, 138 Wis. 2d 418, 433-34, 406 N.W.2d 385, 391 (1987).
51. 2 COBBETT'S, supra note 1, at 16.
52. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
53. See United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1979).
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based entirely on hearsay. In such a situation, the defendant has never had
the opportunity to confront non-hearsay evidence.
We have, therefore, traveled a complete circle. We began by excluding
hearsay because it prevented the accused from confronting his accuser. We
developed exceptions because, as a general matter, the evidence which was
the subject of the exception seemed reliable. We then apply those excep-
tions with unassailable logic and culminate with convictions where the right
to confront is reduced to a general attack on presumably dispassionate psy-
chological testimony.54 Ultimately, the accuser does not testify and is im-
mune from cross-examination. 55
There is a method out of this quandry which has not been addressed and
seems to have been overlooked generally. All of the cases discussed, and
many others like them, fail to recognize the distinction between the admissi-
bility of evidence and the sufficiency of evidence. Each of the analyses de-
scribed have concerned admissibility, and once it has been determined that
the evidence is admissible, there is no further discussion. 6 However, such a
54. Throughout this Article there has been an assumption that the psychologist's testimony
is, essentially, reliable. This may not be the case. See D. FAUST, K. HART AND T. GUILMETrE,
Pediatric Malingering: The Capacity of Children to Fake Believable Deficits on Neuropsychological
Testing, 56 JOURNAL OF CONSULTING AND CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 578 (1988); see also Psycholo-
gists' Expert Testimony Called Unscientific, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1983, at 19, col. 1.
55. States are free to fashion exceptions to the rule against hearsay beyond those found in the
federal rules. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970). Pursuant to this freedom, one approach has
been the enactment of statutory exceptions to the hearsay rule directed specifically at child abuse
cases. See Note, A Comprehensive Approach to Child Hearsay Statements in Sex Abuse Cases, 83
COLUM. L. Rnv. 1745, 1763-66 (1983); Note, supra note 41, at 811-13. Under this exception, a
hearsay rule exception exists for children under the age of ten who describe any act of sexual
contact performed on them by another, if the court finds that circumstances provide indicia of
reliability and the child either testifies, or is unavailable, in which case the statement may be
admitted, but only if there is corroborative evidence of the act. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6
(Burns 1985 & Supp. 1988).
Such statutes have been found constitutional even though the corroboration requirement per-
tains only to the act of sexual abuse, not the identity of the abuser. Miller v. State, 498 N.E.2d
1008 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Slider, 38 Wash. App. 689, 688 P.2d 538 (1984). The child
hearsay exception is broader than FED. R. EVID. 803(4) since such statements apply to any out-of-
court statement, not just those made for purposes of diagnosis. The exception can also be seen as
narrower than FED. R. EVID. 803(4) since unavailability is a requirement of the rule. Unavailabil-
ity is defined, however, to include those instances where a psychiatrist certifies that the child's
participation in the trial would be traumatic for the child, a concept of unavailability not directly
found in FED. R. EVID. 804(a).
56. A suggestion of the distinction appears in the concurring opinion in People v. Wilkins,
134 Mich. App. 39, 349 N.W.2d 815 (1984). In Wilkins, the majority found that the testimony of
the psychologist as to whom the patient said was the assailant was admissible under the rationale
that identity was necessary for treatment. Id. at -, 349 N.W.2d at 818. The concurring judge
reserved judgment as to whether such evidence alone could be the basis for a guilty verdict, but
concurred in that case because the victim testified and identified the defendant. Id. (Shepherd, J.,
concurring).
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limited view of the question is by no means compelled. A court is certainly
free to conclude that evidence is admissible to prove a particular point, but
at the same time it is not sufficient to warrant submission of the evidence to
a jury.57
In criminal conspiracy cases or in any criminal case involving joint ven-
turers, the prosecution often relies on hearsay evidence. Thus, if A and B
are charged with selling a controlled substance, any statement made by A in
furtherance of the venture is admissible against B. If, however, there is only
hearsay evidence against B, traditionally B cannot be convicted. There
must be some non-hearsay proof as to B's involvement to create the agency
which renders admissible against him statements made by A."
The approach that the courts use to permit admission of hearsay against
a joint venturer or co-conspirator provides guidance as to how these troub-
lesome questions of hearsay in child sexual abuse cases can be resolved.
Under the rules of evidence applicable to joint ventures, before the hearsay
can be considered by the jury against a particular defendant, the court must
be satisfied, based on non-hearsay evidence, that a particular defendant is a
member of the venture. The degree of proof required for such a determina-
tion is the civil standard: by a fair preponderance of the evidence. 9 If such
proof exists, the hearsay is submitted to the jury. The jury is instructed to
57. For example, assume that in an automobile negligence case, the plaintiff calls a witness
who testifies that at the time of the accident the witness was crossing the street with an unidenti-
fied person who was looking at the intersection at the time of the collision, and who, right after-
wards, said that the red car drove through a red light. Such evidence would be admissible as an
excited utterance under FED. R. EVID. 803(2). The unidentified nature of the speaker would go to
the weight of the evidence. It is highly unlikely that such evidence, though clearly admissible,
would get to the jury on the negligence of the driver of the red car if that were the only evidence of
negligence. Admissibility and sufficiency issues are completely severable.
58. See United States v. Bucaro, 801 F.2d 1230, 1232-33 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Vinson, 606 F.2d 149, 152-53 (6th Cir. 1979). But see Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171
(1987). The Supreme Court in Bouriaily stated that FED. R. EVID. 104 permits hearsay to boot-
strap other hearsay into evidence. In Boudaily, the Court held that hearsay could be used to
determine whether the necessary agency relation existed to justify the use of hearsay in the first
place, much the way the crown urged that Cobham's hearsay statement to his brother buttressed
the admissibility of the hearsay confession. See id. at _. This broad holding was in no way
essential to the decision since Bourjaily's presence in a car into which the drugs were placed
coupled with the $20,000 in cash also found in the car easily established Boujaily's nexus to the
drug conspiracy through non-hearsay evidence. See Note, Bourjaily v. United States, 1988 Wis. L.
REV. 577, 595-96. See generally Graham, The Confrontation Clause, The Hearsay Rule and Child
Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: The State of the Relationship, 72 MINN. L. REV. 523 (1988). How-
ever, Bourlaily has been interpreted to reflect a major change on the ability of hearsay to justify
the admission of hearsay. See also United States v. Zambrana, 841 F.2d 1320, 1344 (7th Cir.
1988).
59. United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128, 1134 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Geaney,
417 F.2d 1116, 1120 (2d Cir. 1969). But see supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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consider all the evidence and decide whether the prosecution has sustained
its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. On the other hand,
if the non-hearsay proof does not rise to the fair preponderance level, the
hearsay never gets to the jury.
Such an approach in child sexual abuse cases will often require that the
child testify. This in turn will trigger procedures designed to accommodate
the interest of the child, while at the same time leaving intact the defend-
ant's right to confront. Videotaping of such testimony is one obvious ap-
proach to such accommodation,60 although there does not appear to be
universal agreement that videotaping is ultimately consistent with a defend-
ant's rights.61
It is not, however, a foregone conclusion that the child will have to
testify. The proposal suggested here requires only that there be non-hear-
say proof by a fair preponderance of the evidence, a requirement that does
not necessarily require a particular kind of non-hearsay. If there is evidence
that a child emerged from the defendant's exclusive custody in a battered or
bruised condition, such condition, if not otherwise explained, would lead to
a fairly strong inference that the battering or bruising was at the defendant's
hands. Alone, this might be a sufficient basis for the admission of the cor-
roborating hearsay.62
As is the case with conspiracy, there is no particular time when a court
must make the determination that the non-hearsay proof justifies the use of
hearsay as long as the determination is made before the case is submitted to
the jury. Since the psychologist may well be the last witness that the prose-
cution calls, as experts usually are, all of the foundation evidence for the
hearsay should already be before the court. On the other hand, if a parent
of the child or a social worker testifies early in the trial and as part of that
testimony states what the child told the witness, the evidence can be re-
ceived subject to connection. 3
60. See State v. Gilbert, 109 Wis. 2d 501, 326 N.W.2d 744 (1982); see also United States v.
Fromme, 405 F. Supp. 578, 583 (E.D. Cal. 1975); State v. Harris, 268 S.C. 117, 232 S.E.2d 231
(1977); Note, supra note 41, at 813-16.
61. The ABA "Guidelines for the Fair Treatment of Child Witnesses in Cases Where Child
Abuse is Alleged," approved by the ABA House of Delegates on July 10, 1985, do not contem-
plate the use of videotapes in criminal trials. The closest they come is to suggest the use of such
tapes in the pretrial or non-criminal settings. See Guideline 30).
62. See Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721 (Wyo. 1984), where a child was found bruised by a
female adult taking care of her after having been alone with the defendant for some time. Id. at
723. There was also make-up on the child's face suggesting that the defendant tried to conceal the
injuries. Id. at 728.
63. Geaney, 417 F.2d at 1120.
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There is no question that implementation of the suggestion advanced in
this Article will make it more difficult to obtain convictions in some child
sexual abuse cases. In a system, however, where the defendant is presumed
innocent and where the burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, difficulty in obtaining convictions is not a final
answer to anything. The argument that more child sexual abuse cases will
go unprosecuted is by itself no more weighty an argument than "a number
of Treasons should flourish." We should not let the perniciousness of the
crime affect the fundamental fairness of the proceedings in which the deter-
mination of the criminal's identity is made. If we do, it would not be the
first time that an argument with an old and familiar ring prevailed.
IV. CONCLUSION
As this brief venture into child sexual abuse cases has shown, there is a
clear conflict between the interests of a child in avoiding testifying at a trial
and the defendant's interest in questioning the witness. While a logical ap-
plication of the hearsay rule exceptions can easily result in admissible evi-
dence pointing unmistakably to the defendant's guilt, exclusive reliance on
such evidence puts the defendant in the position where he has no meaning-
ful witness to cross-examine. As a result, the defendant is essentially placed
in the dilemma that the rule against hearsay is designed to avoid.
If the distinction between admissibility and sufficiency is kept in mind,
then the logic of the numerous hearsay rule exceptions can be accepted, and
at the same time the defendant's right to confront would be left intact. By
requiring at least some non-hearsay proof of the defendant's guilt, it is sug-
gested that a workable compromise between two otherwise irreconcilable
interests can be reached.
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